Non-Aggression Pact with Germany Essay

Non-aggression pact between Germany and the Soviet Union (German: Deutsch-Sowjetischer Nichtangriffspakt; also known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact) – an intergovernmental agreement signed on August 23, 1939 by the heads of departments of Foreign Affairs of Germany and the Soviet Union. From the Soviet Union the agreement was signed by Commissar for Foreign Affairs, V.M. Molotov, from Germany by Foreign Minister I. von Ribbentrop.
“The speech about roasted chestnuts” was the name given to Stalin’s speech, delivered on March 10, 1939 at the 13th Congress of the CPSU (b). In this speech Stalin accused the British and the French of provoking war, and declared his readiness for the policy of appeasement towards Germany (Deutscher 58). Enumerating the aggressive acts of the axis powers and blaming them on the non-aggressive countries, primarily Britain and France, who refused from the policy of collective resistance to the aggressors in favor of the position of non-intervention and “neutrality”, he then formulated the following main objectives of the Soviet policy (West 53-63):
1. Continue the policy of peace and strengthening business relations with all countries.
2. Not let the country to be involved into conflicts by the instigators of war, accustomed to have their chestnuts pulled out of the fire.
According to some historians, the speech was considered by Ribbentrop as an allusion to the possibility of improving relations between Germany and the Soviet Union. Subsequently, after the conclusion of the Pact, Molotov named it the beginning of a turnabout in Soviet-German relations (Roberts 57-78).
The parties to the agreement pledged to refrain from attacking each other and to observe neutrality in case one of them became the object of military action of a third party. Participants of the agreement also refused to participate in the grouping of powers, either directly or indirectly acting against the other side. The Pact provided a mutual exchange of information on matters affecting the interests of the parties.
To the agreement was attached a secret additional protocol on the delimitation of areas of mutual interests in Eastern Europe in case of a territorial and political rearrangement. The Protocol provided the inclusion of Latvia, Estonia, Finland, the eastern areas belonging to the Polish state and Bessarabia in the Soviet sphere of interest; and Lithuania and the west of Poland in the sphere of German interests (Roberts 57-78; Henig 31-34).
The treaty was signed after the period of cooling of political and economic Soviet-German relations caused by the ascension of Adolf Hitler, and armed conflicts in which the USSR opposed Hitler coalition: Germany and Italy in Spain, and Japan in Far East. The Treaty became a political surprise to third countries. Hearsay about the existence of additional secret agreement appeared shortly after the signing of the Pact (Henig 35-38; West 53-63). The text of the protocol was published in 1948 from photocopies, and in 1993 from the newly found originals.
On September 1, 1939 Germany began the invasion of Poland, and September 17, 1939 Soviet troops entered the territory of Poland. The territorial division of Poland between the USSR and Germany was completed on September 28, 1939 with signing of the treaty on friendship and the border. Later the USSR annexed the Baltic states, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, as well as part of Finland (Kennan 105-111).
After Germany attacked the Soviet Union on June 22, 194, the agreement, as well as all the other Soviet-German treaties became no longer valid. In 1989, the Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR condemned the secret additional protocol to the treaty and declared it illegal from the date of signing.The version of the Soviet Union’s desire to avoid war with Germany

This version that Stalin’s decision to sign the pact was motivated by necessity is typically kept by the Soviet and modern Russian historiography. The treaty was signed after the failure of Moscow negotiations, held in the spring and summer of 1939 by representatives of the USSR, Britain and France to conclude a tripartite agreement on mutual aid (the draft treaty was submitted by the Soviet Government on June 2) and military convention suggesting concrete military measures to ensure collective security in Europe.
The negotiations revealed the unwillingness of Britain and France to accept specific military obligations and develop real military plans to counter a possible German aggression. Moreover, simultaneously with the Moscow negotiations, the British government held negotiations in London with German representatives on the division of spheres of influence (Doerr 423-39). And this further enforced the fears of the Soviet government that its Western partners tended to direct Hitler’s aggression to the East, that aggression, which had already led to the “Munich Agreement” and the division of Czechoslovakia. After the failure of the Moscow negotiations, the Soviet Union lost hope for military coalition with Western powers and found itself in a hostile surrounding, when its potential opponents in the West were both the countries of “cordon sanitaire”, and Germany, while militarist Japan played the role of aggressor in the East. In these circumstances, the Soviet Union was forced to accept the German proposal to start negotiations on the Non-Aggression pact (Doerr 423-39; Henig 48-53; Neville 569-82).
The position of the Western powers determined the failure of the Moscow negotiations and made the Soviet Union face the alternative: to be isolated before a direct threat of the attack of Nazi Germany or, after exhausting the possibility of an alliance with Britain and France, to sign the proposed by Germany non-aggression pact, and thereby push away the threat of war. The situation made the second choice inevitable. The Soviet-German treaty signed on August, 23 1939 determined the fact that, contrary to the accounts of Western politicians, the world war began with clashes inside the capitalist world (Neville 569-82).
Thus, the signing of non-aggression treaty with Germany was the only way to avoid the war with Germany and other countries of the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1939, when the Soviet Union was in isolation, having no allies.
So, why was there the necessity in the treaty for Soviet Union and why did Soviet Union benefited from it?
First, Non-Aggression Treaty secured the country from the threat of war on two fronts. The non-aggression pact was signed in the conditions when Soviet troops for the fourth month were leading heavy battles with the Japanese in the east of the country in Khalkhin-Gol. Now we know that the battles in the Far East would have been completed by September 1939 with the absolute defeat of the Japanese Army. But at that time, on August 23, 1939, people of that generation just remembered the sad final, the 1905 war against Japan ended with for imperial Russia. Taking into consideration the fact that Japan was an ally of Germany according to Anti-Comintern Pact, the conflict could escalate into a full-scale war of the Soviet Union not only with Japan, but also with its allies on the military-political bloc (Germany, Italy) (Moore 147-53).
Besides, Great Britain also openly supported Japan in its focus on China and farther north to the borders of the Soviet Union. During the fighting at Khalkhin-Gol in 1939, on July 22, Japanese Foreign Minister Hachiro Arita and British Ambassador to Japan Robert Craigie signed the agreement, which was immediately described by the contemporaries as “Far Eastern Munich” (Moore 147-53).
Under this agreement, Britain recognized the “special rights” of Japan in the area. In other words, this agreement put the Soviet Union in front of the fact that Japanese aggression in Khalkhin-Gol and preparation of Hitler’s war in Europe were the two merging events. Thus, the United Kingdom (not without the consent of the USA) frankly provoked the two-front war against the Soviet Union already in 1939 (Doerr 423-39).
Second, Non-Aggression Pact inflicted a crushing blow to the Anti-Comintern bloc, which was anti-Soviet in its content, and drove a wedge of distrust between the allies, as the initiative of a treaty on non-aggression came from Germany just at the time, when its ally in the bloc (Japan) was at war with the Soviet Union (Moore 147-53).
The Soviet-German pact was seen in Tokyo as a betrayal. As a result, relations between the Third Reich and the Far Eastern ally were badly marred. Japan claimed its protest to Germany, pointing out that the Soviet-German treaty contradicts the Anti-Comintern Pact, under which the signatories committed themselves not to conclude any political agreements with the Soviet Union without the mutual consent (Moore 147-53; Roberts 57-78; Short 78-84).
Third, Non-Aggression Pact ensured peace and security of the borders in the Far East for the entire period of the World War II. The blow on the block was so severe that it led to a government crisis in Japan. The Japanese Cabinet led by Kiichiro Hiranuma, a supporter of a joint Sino-German War against the Soviet Union, was forced to resign on August 28, 1939. As a result, the Japanese ruling circles made the choice in favor of the Southern variant, supposing the war with Great Britain and the United States. However, after Germany attacked the USSR, Japan didn’t act against the Soviet Union (Roberts 57-78; Doerr 423-39).
This strategic pact finally managed to save many millions of lives and keep homes and economic facilities in the East from the destruction. The Soviet Union thus gained the possibility to concentrate its key efforts during World War II in the West, against Hitler’s Germany, holding minimal force in the East.
Next, Non-Aggression pact pulled the Soviet Union out of international isolation, in which it had been intentionally driven by political circles of Britain and France.
After the conclusion of a cynical agreement in Munich (1938) between Hitler’s Germany, Italy, Britain and France, the USSR found itself without allies. Western participants of this conspiracy made concessions to the territorial claims of Nazi Germany to Czechoslovakia. And therefore, mutual aid agreements with the Soviet Union, France and Czechoslovakia (1935) were no longer valid (Kennan 45-53; Neville 569-82).
And although on April, 17 1939 the Soviet Union proposed a tripartite pact of mutual assistance between Britain, France and the Soviet Union, stressing that Poland and other European countries could also join it, the British government openly rejected this proposal. Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, stated on April, 26 at a session of British Government, that it was not right time for such an all-encompassing proposal (Doerr 423-39).
Only on July, 25 the British, and July, 26 the French government accepted the proposal of the USSR to start negotiations on a military convention, and expressed willingness to send representatives to Moscow. Negotiations began on August, 12, but it immediately became clear that the French delegation headed by General J. Doumenc had only authority to negotiate but not sign the agreement, and the British delegation headed by Admiral Drax had no written authority at all. While France had already felt the danger, the British leadership headed by Chamberlain still hoped to make a deal with Hitler and considered the contacts with the Soviet Union only as a means of pressure on Berlin (Doerr 423-39).
The British government had no desire to be drawn into any sort of certain obligations, which would tie its hands in any circumstances. Therefore, it tended to limit any military agreements by the most general possible wording.
Thus, Britain and France left Soviet Russia face-to-face with the aggressor. And when in those conditions, Germany suggested the USSR to conclude the Non-Aggression pact for 10 years, the refusal would mean literally the provocation of the war. And then the Soviet Union would today be criticized for the refusal from piece. However, it should be noticed, that liberals today would have condemned any choice of the Soviet Union either the conclusion of Non-Aggression pact, or its rejection.
Further, the Non-Aggression pact disturbed the plans of Britain, France and other Western political forces for clashing Germany with Soviet Russia in order to stay out of the war, that is, to stay above the battle, and enter the situation in a convenient moment to impose their own terms to the exhausted parties and the rest of the world. Very cynically, but frankly, this attitude was expressed by Harry Truman in the sense that if the USSR was winning, the US should help Germany, and vice versa, if Germany was winning, it should help the Soviet Union (West 53-63).
Political analysts describe this situation as follows: Britain had to direct the aggression only to the East, which would give an excuse to intervene and enter to Eastern Europe to protect it and complete the geo-political projects, that is, to withdraw the Eastern Europe from under the control of both Germany and the Soviet Union. It clearly expected that Germany would attack Poland in one campaign in the East, getting involved in a doomed to mutual exhaustion war with the Soviet Union, which promised the preservation of the Western Europe at a relatively low cost, and also suggested the intervention into the Eastern Europe for its protection (West 53-63; Roberts 57-78; Moore 147-53).
It was under these circumstances that Stalin signed the Non-Aggression pact. As a result, instead of blocking against the Soviet Union, Germany and Britain and France launched the war with each other. This meant that the Soviet Union did not have to fight with those and others simultaneously. Moreover, the USSR now could join the war later than other participants.
And finally, instead of the threat to have a war with all the Western countries, there appeared a prospect to have Britain as, if not very reliable, but still, an ally in the approaching war. If previously Britain tried to avoid any alliance with the USSR, in the end it found itself in a situation of acute interest in an alliance with Soviet Union (Doerr 423-39).
And this is still an incomplete list of the historically most important advantages and benefits the Soviet Union received as a result of the conclusion of the Non-Aggression Pact. The necessity to sign the Pact laid the weighty foundation of the future victory in the war against fascist Germany.

Conclusion

Taking into account the archival sources, military plans of the parties and the nature of the consequent actions, the analysis of the historical situation in August 1939 leads to the following conclusions.
The Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the USSR of August 23, 1939 equaled the position of the USSR in relation to Germany with the position of Britain and France, who signed the declaration of non-aggression with Germany in 1938.
Besides, during the signing of the Pact, the Soviet leadership and Hitler did not know, and the leaders of France and Britain did not yet decided what they would declare war on Germany because of Poland. So there is no evidence to suggest that the Soviet Union pushed Germany into war with the West, moreover, even after the signing of the Pact, Soviet Union offered to return to negotiations with Western powers.
On the other hand, the refusal of the Soviet Union to sign the pact would complicate international situation and increase the threat of the involvement in the war on two fronts, together with international isolation.
Thus, 1939 Non-Aggression Pact can be historically justified by the necessity to avoid war. The Pact meant the collapse of the most dangerous option for the Soviet Union at World War II – canalization of fascist aggression against the Soviet bloc for its international isolation. The Pact provided Stalin with almost two years for strengthening the defense, made it possible to significantly improve Soviet Union’s strategic position in the West, and brought contradictions in the relations between Japan and Germany. Trade agreements were also important for the development of the defense industry. But still, the treaty cannot be considered a diplomatic victory of the USSR. Soviet diplomacy failed to achieve the main goal of foreign policy during this period – to create an Anglo-Franco-Soviet military alliance. The Pact was a diplomatic zigzag, with the option among possible worst ones, caused by Stalin to avoid the war between Soviet Union and Germany.