Essay on Napoleon's genius strategies and tactics on the battlefield

Napoleon’s strategy and tactics of battles

Strategy is the art of making use of time and space.
I am less concerned about the latter than the former.
Space we can recover, lost time never.”

Napoleon’s strategy was aimed at destroying enemy forces in the pitched battle.  Napoleon said to the Austrian general after the victory over their army: “In Europe there are many good generals, but they see too many things at once. I see only one thing – the masses of enemy troops. I try to destroy them, being sure that everything else will collapse together with them.” (Luvaas, 2001)
In the war Napoleon was intended to resolve the outcome in the final battle. Destroying the enemy army in one or several pitched battles, he captured his capital, and dictated to him the conditions of agreements. Napoleon said that from the battle “depends the fate of the army, state or possession of the throne.” (Chandler, 1995)

Battle of Marengo (1800), according to Napoleon, gave Italy to France; the Battle of Ulm (1805) eliminated the entire army, the battle of Jena (1806) resulted in the conquest of the entire Prussian monarchy, the battle of Echmuhl (1809) decided the fate of the entire campaign. The battle of Borodino (1812) was one of those where the extraordinary efforts have brought unsatisfactory results. At the Battle of Waterloo (in 1815), the last battle of Napoleon, failed, but if it were successful then France would be saved, and Europe would have another way of life. Considering battle as the decisive act of war, Napoleon said that it should not be given if you did not count on the 70 percent success. (Norsworthy B, 1995)
One of the characteristics of Napoleon’s strategy was to create a superior force at a decisive direction. “The essence of strategy – Napoleon said – is that with a weaker army to have more power than the enemy, at that point at which you attack or the enemy attacks you.” (Luvaas, 2001)

The French commander artfully defined critical area – the main theater of war – and tried to concentrate there the most of his troops. But in contrast, for example, to Suvorov, who in many battles had less strength than the enemy, the French leader in nearly all his battles had a superiority of forces.

Napoleon’s strategy was as follows: The French army, having a superiority in strength, quickly and skillfully maneuvering, appeared on the chosen direction, and having won it rushed further. In that way in 1805, after defeating the Austrian army at Ulm, the French army soon defeated the Russian army at Austerlitz; in 1806 Napoleon achieved victory over the Prussian army at Jena and Auershtedt, preventing Russian troops to come to help it in time. (Norsworthy B, 1995)

When Napoleon went into battle with fewer forces than that of the enemy, in this case he argued that smaller forces are often defeated by superior powers. Having before him a superior enemy, he threw the troops into the attack against one of the enemy’s flanks, broke it and used the confusion of the enemy to strike him from the other sides. Thus, he attacked the parts of enemy forces with his superior forces, breaking the enemy’s army into parts, but he always sought to prevent the division of his own army. (Norsworthy B, 1995)

One of the basic principles of the strategy of battles of Napoleon was sending all the forces (or part of the forces) on the flank or behind the enemy lines, in order to capture its communication line, cut it off from their supply bases, and forced to accept battle in a very unfavorable terms – with inverted front. Such strategy was applied by Napoleon’s troops at Marengo in 1800, at Ulm in 1805, at Jena in 1806. The French army, carrying workaround, took into account the main features and actions of enemy troops; when the French army isolated enemy troops from sources of supply, they put them in a very difficult position. The strategy of Napoleon’s army was strong, characterized by an offensive course of action. Initiative actions, the rapid and sudden approximation to the enemy in order to create most favorable conditions for battle are the characteristic actions of French troops.

A significant place in Napoleon’s strategy was given to castles and positional field fortifications. But the siege of fortresses in the presence of the enemy’s army was considered very risky, and required large forces, and the success associated with the capture of the fortress was not decisive. Therefore, Napoleon rarely made sieges of castles.

The tactics of the French Napoleonic forces was dependent on the strategy designed to destroy the enemy’s army in the battle field. Strategy and tactics were directed to implement a common goal – to win a general battle. As it was already said the Napoleon’s strategy was based on the concentration of troops on the main line, the main theater of war, chosen against an opponent who was part of a coalition, and to concentrate all possible forces to the battlefield. And the tactics lied in concentration of superior forces to the point selected for main attack. “If we are going to join the battle – Napoleon said – you need to concentrate all your forces, without losing sight of even the smallest parts: one battalion can be decisive for the whole battle.” (Luvaas, 2001)

Napoleon always sought to be stronger than the enemy on the direction chosen for the offensive and attack. Thus, the tactics of French troops was based on strong position, superiority of forces on the chosen area for an attack, on  bold and deep maneuvers, on the allocation and use of large reserves. The success of the battle was due to close coordination of infantry, cavalry and artillery, maneuvering of the troops on the battlefield from one position to another.

The French commander in planning the war tried to make correct assessment of his forces and enemy forces, which resulted in Napoleon’s army numerous brilliant victories. But at the same time, it would be wrong not to see his failures to assess, for example, forces of Russia in 1812. Although one should not forget that Napoleon was preparing to march on Russia very carefully and prepared a huge army – more than 400 thousand people. Despite this he has lost, and Napoleon’s words were: “He that makes war without many mistakes has not made war very long”. (Luvaas, 2001)

Conclusion

The reasons of the success of Napoleon’s personality is that he possessed a phenomenal memory and capacity for work, great intelligence, military and government leadership talents, the gift of a diplomat. Undoubted are his talents as a leader and commander. Thanks to his plans and skillful leadership, his tactics and strategies on the battlefield the French army could win numerous battles. He was admired by French people, and the evidence of this is the majestic Arc de Triomphe in Paris, made in honor of his victories, which  remains a symbol of national pride of France. This man in a gray coat and cocked hat takes a firm place in the history, giving his name to the whole era.